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INTRODUCTION
I will proceed with my history, telling
the story as I go along of small cities
no less than of great. For most of those
which were great once are small today;
and those which used to be small were
great in my own time. Knowing...that
human prosperity never abides long in
the same place.'
Herodotus (c. 484-425 B.C.)
Social and biological history attempts to plot the passage through time
of certain events or populations. In history, events and life are inevitably
observed as a function of time, whereas time is the independent variable which
provides the necessary "room" for history to happen.
It is relatively easy to isolate a component of the universe and observe
how it has been modified over time. The degree of difficulty increases,
however, when several aspects of life are plotted against time. Aristotle made
such an attempt and ended up visualizing life through time as an endless
circle. The Christian faith's equation is a perfectly straight line. Hegel's
conclusion was a line with a positive slope
In this study the results are not as simple as a circle or a line.
Nevertheless, a pattern common for both biology and culture, and closely2
related to infelicity,3 was detected. Based on that pattern we have tried to
demonstrate how the unhappiness of a nation can be the driving motor of its
future prosperity.
The argument concerning the nature and meaning of infelicity is very
relevant to us and has been considered by several significant political
scientists, philosophers, and psychologists. Thinkers like Thomas Hobbes,
Jeremy Bentham, Sigmund Freud and Aristotle attempted to deal with the
subject, and their conclusions on unhappiness impart fascinating inferences.
Hobbes did not believe that felicity could be achieved in this mortal
life, but asserted that its pursuit was nevertheless a motor for behavior. For
Hobbes, continual success is synonymous with happiness, or, in his own
words, "Continual success [italics in the original] in obtaining those things
which a man from time to time desireth, that is to say, continual prospering is
what men call felicity; I mean the felicity of this life." But because Hobbes
saw human desires as unlimited, he believed that the achievement of happiness
was an impossibility. Elaborating on this idea he stated: "felicity is the
continual progress of the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of
the former, being still but the way to the later...I put for a general inclination
of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power that
ceaseth only in death."'3
Bentham saw humanity less pessimistically than Hobbes. For Bentham,
happiness was "the central trunk [of life] and all human activities were
branches of it."6 Further, he defined happiness as "the general end of
government"' and argued that a political constitution that does not pursue that
general end was not appropriate for the constituents. One could say that in
Bentham's opinion the acquisition of happiness is possible and, to a large
extent, dependent on a good constitution.
Freud also considered happiness central for human activities and,
contrary to Bentham and in agreement with Hobbes, it was not determined by
a good constitution, but by human desires, the pursuit of which willaffect the
judgment of value. To put it in Freud's own words, "the judgments of value
made by mankind are immediately determined by their desires for happiness."8
Here we must equate "desires for happiness" with "sexual and aggressive
instincts," which he argued are the product of natural selection or "natural
necessities."' But Freud, above all, situated unhappiness, or the pursuit of
happiness, over all things determining human behavior: "they [humans] seek
happiness, they want to become happy and to remain so."' He recognized
that our possibilities for happiness are remote and will depend on a very
difficult balance of our personality, that is, a balance between what he called
the id, ego and super ego --the characteristics of which are beyond the scope
of this thesis. But what is important to us is that he recognized infelicity as
the driving motor for human activity.4
Aristotle defined felicity as "the most desirable way of life."" The best
way of life for any living thing will be linked to its biological attributes. For
example, a happy bird will necessarily need, among other things, a healthy
pair of wings, as a happy fish will need operating gills. This is part of what
biologists call fitness. But humans need other things beyond physical fitness
to be happy. Aristotle, as Bentham, mentioned that "the best way of life will
go together with the best constitutionpossible.' And the best constitution
possible for a nation will arise from government that reflects its culture. The
incompatibility between government and culture, as we will see below, is a
major problem for many Latin American countries.
In 1986, when Mexican writer and philosopher Carlos Fuentes was
asked his opinion of the major challenges faced by the human race, without
hesitation he mentioned two areas of concern: first, the possibility of a nuclear
holocaust and, second, the ever-widening technological gap between
underdeveloped nations and already developed countries on this planet. Much
as the Berlin Wall physically divided East Germany from West Germany,
there is an invisible wall, a technological gap, separating the underdeveloped
from the developed nations. As a result, most inhabitants of underdeveloped
countries are very unhappy with their present situation, many of them living in
sub-human conditions. This essay is an attempt to understand the nature of
this technological gap and the consequences of the infelicity produced by it,
visualizing Latin America as a group of backward countries with a high5
potential for evolutionary progress. But, unfortunately, Latin American states
exist in a world where their evolutionary potential could be curtailed by the
will of already developed countries.
Our thesis is that infelicity works as a vector which increases the
possibility of change for biological life and for social organization. Based on
that premise we argue that Latin American countries, as well as other
underdeveloped nations, have the potential to develop not necessarily a more
thermodynamically-efficient13 socio-economic structure than the ones that
prevail in today's capitalist nations, but at least a better place to live for their
citizens.
Infelicity is only one of the forces that affects social evolution. There
are other factors, like cultural disposition, the international environment,
economic capability, and natural resources, that are important, if not crucial, in
the evolution of societies. As a result of the research, we have found that for
the case of Latin America the cultural disposition and the economic capability
are favorable forces that, together with the unhappiness that prevails in the
area, form a formidable vector for positive change. But, unfortunately, it has
also been found that significant foreign opposition to such an attempt is
hindering the Latin American revolutionary process and its possibility for
positive social evolution. We are referring to the United States' intervention
during this century, which has hurt many Latin American countries with
pro-socialist governments and those in the middle of a revolutionary process.6
Not all the interventionist activity of the United States is focused on socialism;
it has also been the policy of the White House to attack Latin American
countries in order to preserve United States interest. But, because a big threat
to the interest of capitalism is socialism itself, socialist countries and
movements have been a prime target for intervention.
Our definition of socialism is wide, and in the case of Latin America it
can have different styles or, as Nobel Prize winner Gabriel Garcia Marquez
argues, it could have as many forms as countries in theAmericas.14 Latin
American socialism can be different from one country to another. For
example, the Cuban system, which is characterized by a centralized economy,
differed from the Nicaraguan model, which implemented a mixed economy.
Our conviction is that Latin Americans must develop their own solutions and
to a certain extent take advantage of historical opportunities and the mistakes
of other nations. At this point, we are referring to Latin American countries
that have experienced long and shaky periods of socialism. Nevertheless,
they should not copy socialist models in a crude way. Ultimately, Latin
American socialism should promote, without exception, the Marxist idea of
equal opportunity and Saint Thomas Aquinas' notion of the common good.'
In general, socialism is characterized by several concepts that, in one
way or another, should be present in any authentic socialist state. For
example, there should be democratic participation of all workers in the
decision-making process concerning their place of work. Also, the state should7
be responsible for a widespread distribution of wealth among citizens. More
important, it must be a social system in which the workers possess political
power, the means of production, and the distribution of goods.
Furthermore, the process of socialism arises from a country's internal
conditions and cannot be forcefully imposed by a more powerful socialist
nation. The former so-called popular democracies of Eastern Europe are
prime examples of how the imposition of socialism on a nation which is not
ready for it can promote infelicity and, subsequently, change. Contrary to
Latin American socialist governments, the Eastern European socialists were
not confronted by strong CIA-backed counter-revolutionary activity or by total
economic embargoes; nevertheless, their systems crumbled as soon as the
nation that was responsible for the artificial implantation of socialism, the
Soviet Union, stopped support for those artificial governments. On the
contrary, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua held elections in 1990 under very
unfavorable conditions created by the United States and its allies and managed
to obtain more than forty percent of the vote. Even by losing the presidential
elections, they managed to remain the most important political force in that
country.It is hard to guess what would be the result of a future election in
Cuba, but it is obvious that Castro's government holds a substantial amount of
support in his country and, contrary to the Eastern European popular
democracies, was, in spite of many economic difficulties, not shackled by the
revolts of the Eastern bloc.8
We believe that one of the reasons for these discrepancies is that the
Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions were indigenous movements prompted by
their adherent unhappiness.
These concepts of socialism are to be taken into consideration by any
nation that is trying to implement that system. But, without a doubt, Latin
American socialists should analyze the conditions inside their own country
before a crude implementation of any of these dogmatic concepts.
As with socialism, capitalism may change from one country to another.
For example, the capitalism of many Northern European republics, France,
Spain, and, up to a certain point, England and Germany, differs from the
capitalism of the United States in that Europeans, as Canadians, have adopted
some more socialistic measures and incorporated them intothe capitalist
system. Among them, we have the reforms many European nations have
made to their educational and health facilities which are not present in the
United States. But, generally speaking, the European and the United States'
capitalist models are far away from implementing any of the characteristics of
the socialist model of production mentioned above. Capitalism, as it operates
in the 1990s, can be defined as an economic system marked by open
competition in the free market, in which the means of production and
distribution are privately or corporately owned and development is
proportionate to increasing accumulation and reinvestment of profits. This
holds true for any of today's so-called socialist-capitalist nations like Spain9
and France, which have equated socialism with a few reforms to the capitalist
system. These concepts of socialism and capitalism are critical for the
following argument of the evolution of societies.
Our analysis of the evolutionary potential of underdeveloped nations
rests upon an historical perspective. First, the technological gap is, in itself, a
traditional one. That is, underdeveloped countries are historically backward in
terms of the development and exploitation of energy when compared to
industrialized nations. Second, throughout history, technological differences
between countries have always existed. In effect, there has invariably been a
"Third World," even if the countries that had been part of it have changed
over time. For example, at the turn of this millennium Arab nations were
considered to be at the vanguard in technology, but now, almost a thousand
years later, they form part of today's "Third World." Another more recent
example of ups and downs can be found in medieval times, when Roman
nations (mainly France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal) dominated the Western
hemisphere. Now they are far from being as powerful as they were.
Therefore, we must look back through time and explore what happened
in countries that once were "on top of the ladder" but have since fallen from
that position. Spain offers us a good example. Moreover, we can also study
countries that once were dominated and later became dominant nations. Here
we will look at England and the development of capitalism as an example.10
Human development is an evolutionary process, and to think about the
future panorama of the American continent--for instance, one thousand years
from now--it is necessary to theorize about how societies evolve. Herodotus'
principle of discontinuity in command --the antithesis of the Hegelian dialectic
--has always been present in humans.
It appears to be true, as Hegel thought, that the tendency in human
affairs has been toward socio-economic progress, but it is not from the more
advanced nation that the next, more sophisticated (or thermodynamically
speaking, more efficient) stage of history arises. Here lies Karl Marx's
erroneous prediction about the emergence of socialism in England --at the time
of the Russian Revolution the most advanced capitalist nation of the world.
On the contrary, the first attempt to establish socialism (independent of its
future success) was made by the most backward capitalist nation: Russia.
Empires such as the Egyptian, the Roman, the Ottoman, the Spanish, the
English, the French, the Austro-Hungarian and the Prussian all declined; not a
single one seems to have evolved to the pre-eminent evolutionary stage (see
Table 8); new inputs seem always to come from what, at the time, were
backward nations.
Our analysis of the evolution of history and its change will include the
biological past of humans. It would be ridiculous to argue that natural
selection is present in the evolution of societies, but an astonishing similarity
exists between the way living things and cultures evolve.11
In the biological realm, among all species, less specialized individuals
are those with the higher potential to evolve to a moreadvanced, or
complicated, stage of life. By specialization we mean the degree of relatively
effective exploitation of their ecological niche, and the relative level of fitness
of those organisms. It is important to emphasize that this relationship between
biology and sociology is only analogous because the mechanisms that operate
in each realm are quite different. We are not arguing that natural selection is
present in social evolution. But the motor that moves individuals toward
general change is the same for both realms: unhappiness or dissatisfaction
with their present situation.
In organisms without an advanced central nervous system, infelicity is
more appropriately defined as the inability to adapt. In other words,the
tendency to look for a new niche, either sociological or ecological, depends on
the degree of satisfaction or comfort an individual, and consequently a
population, may encounter in its present one. Satisfaction or fitness will
promote specialization to better compete for the resources of an already
developed niche; this will encourage specific evolution. In specific evolution,
natural selection, or the survival of the fittest, operates. Dissatisfaction or
unfitness will encourage the development of new alternatives; this will
promote general evolution. Here evolution does not follow the rules of natural
selection, and it is the unfit who has the potential to develop and populate a
new niche. For example, because capitalism has beenworking relatively well12
in the United States, attempts at social evolution (like Roosevelt's New Deal
or Reagan's New Federalism) in that country have been made in order to
make the capitalist system operate more efficiently; this is an example of
specific evolution.It seems to be true that within the capitalist world only the
fittest, or best capitalists, survive.
In Latin America, however, where capitalism has been largely a failure,
the tendency in many countries has been to explore a new way of production
different from capitalism: general evolution. This topic of specific and general
evolution will be discussed in detail in this study and is the backbone of this
thesis.
This essay will examine both biological and social evolution and will
try to show how they are related to the invisible wall that divides today's
Latin America from the United States and other contemporary economic
powers.
Several books have been of particular inspiration for this essay.
Among them are Thomas G. Harding'', et al., Evolution and Culture, which
points out what the authors call the Law of Evolutionary Potential.It explains
how historically backward nations have great potential to develop new and
more advanced socio-economic structures (in the sense of distribution of
wealth and exploitation of energy) and ways of livingeven more advanced
than those of today's developed nations.13
The second book, The History of the Russian Revolution, by Leon
Trotsky, makes important contributions.It explains the advantage backward
nations have in "borrowing" technology from advanced countries. Also, it
argues that, in order for backward nations to take advantage of the technology
already developed in the advanced countries, two things are necessary:
economic potential to buy and develop technology, and cultural disposition to
accept positive economic changes. Both conditions, as we will see, are
present in today's Latin American nations.It is precisely the lack of cultural
disposition on the part of Latin Americans toward implementing capitalist
developed nations' economic policies that accounts for many of the blocks in
that invisible wall. Latin American culture, as we will see in Chapter Two, is
more tilted toward a centralized model of economy oriented to the common
good than to a decentralized free enterprise society.
A third book, The Hare and the Tortoise, written by David P. Barash,
argues that social evolution (if it ever happens at all) occurs very slowly when
compared with technological change. Based on this theory we argue that the
cultural traditions of countries included in our study have remained basically
unchanged through history.
Three classic books have also been very useful, if not essential, in our
study: Karl Marx's Capital (in particular volume II); Max Weber's The
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism; and Charles Darwin's The
Origin of the Species. From the first we derived an understanding of the14
development of capitalism in England, and from the second, how cultural
ethos are related to the acceptance or rejection of a way of life. This was the
case in eighteenth century England when capitalism succeeded as an
alternative to the feudal state. From the third book we learned some concepts
of natural selection.
To help understand the concepts of general and specific evolution in a
more tangible way, the biological analogy will be explained in the first
chapter: "A Possible Parallel: Biological Evolution as a Consequence of
Infelicity."
Then, in Chapter Two, "Social Evolution as a Consequence of
Infelicity," some historical evidence will be presented and explained in light of
cultural and economic capabilities and their relation to socio-economic change.
This chapter is written based on the premise that cultural incongruity with an
economic model will invariably produce economic disaster and social chaos. It
establishes that the infelicity of many Latin Americans arises from the
discrepancy between their culture and the ethics associated with the capitalist
mode of production. Also, the situations for the rise of capitalism in the
nineteenth century and socialism in the twentieth will be discussed. The
Protestant ethos and its relationship with the spirit of capitalism, and the
Catholic ethos and its relationship with the legacy of Saint Thomas Aquinas'
doctrines of common good, which are consistent with the spirit of socialism,
are covered in this chapter.15
Chapter Three, Negative Vectors, is an account of United States
intervention in Latin American countries with socialist governments (or where
the struggle for socialism has been established) and discusses a series of
possible rationales behind such a tendency. The last chapter offers a set of
important conclusions.
Is it in the future of Latin America, as part of the so-called Third
World, to be "swallowed" by its now more technologically advanced neighbor?
Or will Latin Americans develop in time a new, in the Marxist sense more
advanced (see Table 8), socio-economic system? This essay is an attempt to
explore in detail both possibilities.16
A POSSIBLE PARALLEL: BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF INFELICITY
May 1, 2093, was a tragic day for the human race. That morning,
while the world celebrated general international festivities, President Zorg, of
the planet Mars, decided to experiment with Earth's inhabitants. After a
surgical laser bombardment, which destroyed most of Earth's physical
infrastructure, he wanted to know the results of an application of a highly
potent, lethal-for-man, electrical field on the already devastated planet. That
electrical field was a very peculiar one: it was meant to be five feet tall and
could only affect humans. In other words, a giraffe, a pine tree, or any other
form of life could not be harmed by it.
At the beginning there were many deaths; almost all the members of
the population standing above five feet tall died instantly; the members of that
group who did not succumb were so affected that they never stood straight for
the remainder of their lives.
But not everything was that tragic, and the individuals who were below
five feet tall did not die; but of course, whenever they grew up and reached
that height, they perished. The only individuals able to survive on Earth's
surface for a full life-span were the ones genetically predisposed to be shorter
than five feet tall: they were the fittest.
As a result, a million years later, the average human being stands four
feet five inches tall.17
It is very unlikely that this Martian nemesis could ever occur (we know
there is no life on Mars, at least not in the way we think of it), but if
something like that would ever happen, you can bet that we humans would
either shrink, die, or flee. In ecological terms, the electrical field is called a
selective agent and is responsible for the way in which man evolved.It was
the change-promoting motor that produced modifications in the characteristics
of the individuals; it allowed small people, who because of their shortness
were not affected by the powerful and unexpected selective agent, to evolve
specifically on an altered planet Earth.It forced those who could not make it
in those conditions to change or die. In the biological world, unfit individuals
living in a state of unhappiness in their niche either perish or have to abandon
their present niche for an alternate one, if available.
An excellent,and far less hypothetical, example of evolution in action
and the workings of natural selection in guiding genetically diverse
populations in particular directions is provided by studies of the peppered
moths (Biston betularia) of Great Britain. Before the onset and spread of the
Industrial Revolution, light-colored moths predominated, and dark moths were
extremely rare, as seen in private collections of the time. As factory chimneys
belched filth into the air and increasing amounts of soot settled on tree trunks
and other places where these moths alighted, a corresponding increase of dark
moths occurred. In areas that remained unindustrialized, light moths remained
predominant. The change in frequencies of the dark and the light alleles of18
the body-color gene was a direct outcome of the advantages of protective
coloration in different environments. Light moths are conspicuous against the
darkened backgrounds in industrialized regions and are subject to heavy
predation by birds, but their body color remains advantageous in regions in
which trees and buildings are not sooty. Dark moths have advantages on
darkened backgrounds, but suffer heavy predation by birds in the areas that
allow light moths to flourish. Each expression of protective coloration is
advantageous in one set of conditions but not in the other. Interestingly, the
frequency of dark moths in England decreased significantly after a program
was introduced to reduce the emission of soot and other componentsof air
pollution. Change in allelic frequencies thus accounts for evolutionary change
guided by natural selection acting on allelic diversity. Allelic diversity allows
dark and light moths to reproduce in both kinds of environments, but the
fitness of each genotype is relative to the environment. Examples of industrial
melanism, as noted in 1985 by K.S. Thompson in an essay that appeared in
Oxford Survey of Evolutionary Biology ("The relationship Between
Development and Evolution), exist in other insects and in spiders in different
regions of the world.
Biological evolution means nothing more than a gradual change (or
rapid change, in the event of mutations) in the quality (genetic make-up) of
living things. Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is widely
accepted; his mechanism of evolution, natural selection, explains many aspects19
of the biological world. Natural selection may be defined as differential
reproduction and survival of individuals carrying alternative inherited traits.It
occurs because genetically different individuals tend to leavedifferent numbers
of progeny in future generations; this allows the genetic composition of the
population to change. For our Martian invasion, the individuals carrying the
alternative inherited traits to survive on the surface of the Earth were the ones
below five feet tall. For the real life example of Biston betularia, the
alternative trait was the allele responsible for dark color, which might have
saved the species from extinction. Later on, they tended to produce offspring
with those genetic traits that accounted for the survival of their parents.
Now that some basic concepts of natural selection have been reviewed,
a less speculative scheme of life can be described.Refer to Table 1, where
seven different forms of life of the animal kingdom havebeen plotted on a
graph. The main idea of the table is based on Darwin's biological dialectic:
"the more complex organs and instincts should have been perfected [italics
added]...by the accumulation [through time] of innumerable slight variations,
each good for the individual possessor."' But perfected in what direction? In a
way that nature selects among those individuals with genesproviding for a
more efficient exploitation inside the niche in which they live(horizontally
measured in Table 1)? Or should perfection be measured vertically, where the
move to a new niche, which requires new skills associatedwith the central
nervous system, is considered a step forward? Darwin did notaddress these20
questions. Furthermore, the possibility of two different evolutionary realms
was not noticed until a century later.
In 1960, a hundred years after the publication of On the Origin of the
Species, Thomas G. Harding, et al., published a book called Evolution and
Culture. The authors differentiate between two aspects of evolution: the
specific and the general. In other words, there are two possible realms in
which progress (or tendency toward perfection) may be achieved.
Specific evolution refers to the evolution that perfects the organisms to
better exploit a particular niche. For example, in the section of the scheme
concerning the kingdom protista (mostly primitive unicellular and acellular
organisms comprising the protozoans, bacteria, algae, and fungi), point A in
Table 1 is considered more specialized (genetically perfected to exploit their
niche) than point B. In other words, individuals at point A have become more
efficient than those at point B in the exploitation of their particular niche,
which makes them more comfortable within it. As Harding states, "In the
context of specific evolution, "advance" [quotations in the original] means that
by adapting modification the population is enabled to maintain or better itself
in the face of a threat induced by changing environment or that it is enabled to
exploit the same environment [italics added] more effectively than before."'
Specific evolution depends only on the features an individual has that enable it
to exploit more efficiently its environment. Specific evolution is proportional
to the degree of fitness (see Table 2). Individuals who are satisfied and live in21
relative comfort in a particular niche have the tendency to evolve horizontally,
sharpening their skills for a better thermodynamic exploitation of their own
niche and becoming more specialized over time. In other words, satisfaction
is a kind of passive response to a specific selective agent, allowing a
population to continue evolving in an ecological niche.
General evolution is a completely different story. It is the overall view
of the scheme without the branches, or "it is the emergence of higher forms of
life, regardless of particular lines of descent."19 For example, in Table 1, the
protozoans in point A were more specialized but less prone to exploit other
niches than were the ones at point B earlier in time. Furthermore, at point C,
the potential of some protozoans to evolve into a higher form of life was very
high because many of them were not satisfied with their niche. In other
words, they were topped by the more specialized satisfied-- individuals.
It is accurate to state that today's advanced species (including humans, of
course) are the product of unhappy protozoans!
A good way to explain how general evolution operates is to analyze the
transition of man's ancestors from the trees to the ground. Those individuals
who were genetically predisposed to keep hanging in the trees (perhaps the
ones with longer tails and toes) did not need to step down to the ground
because they could compete better and live in relative comfort in the branches
(Table 2). The ones who changed niches were those who had smaller tails and
toes and, more important, a more efficient brain to deal with the new niche,22
which was more demanding of abstract thinking than the old one. Attributes
needed in the grassland were not necessarily useful in the trees. In other
words, those who were less specialized to exploit their original niche (the
trees) were the ones more prone to leave because they were unskillful, which
brought dissatisfaction and the tendency to evolve generally (Table 4).It was
a matter of choice between migration and death. Some advantages in one
niche were disadvantages in another.
Whether in a particular time an individual "chooses" to keep on
exploiting its own niche (the trees) or tries to look for another one (the
ground) depends mainly on three things: the degree of competition in its own
niche and in any other possible new one (see tables 4 and 5), the biological
attributes of that individual, and the availability of alternate niche(s) with a
relative lower level of competition (see Table 6). All three things determine
which individuals are satisfied and which are not; they also determine who
will progress and form a new species and who will keep on perfecting and
perpetrating their own.
Progress, in terms of general biological evolution, is associated with the
ability to use the brain in a way that helps in the exploitation of a new niche.
It is important to mention, however, that general evolution is not necessarily
associated with progress. Individuals born with smaller mental capabilities
than those needed in their own niche may find and occupy another niche that
requires a smaller degree of brain activity. In this case it is not appropriate to23
talk about progress but about degeneration. To make this point clear, let us
take a look at Table 7, which is a classification from serological reactions."
At point A, individuals of the family Hominidae "branched" into three genera:
Gorilla, Pan and Homo. As the diagram suggests (brain capacity increases
from left to right), individuals more specialized in their niche did not deviate
substantially from it; those are today's chimpanzees. Besides those specialized
individuals, there were some with variations in the central nervous system,
among other things, which forced them to look for their own spacein order to
survive. The specimens born with less mental capability had to move to
another territory, one congruent with the abilities of the gorillas. They found
comfort in a new territory compatible with their innate abilities. The ones
with greater brain activity occupied, and later improved, a new niche; they are
today's humans. Both gorillas and humans are the descendants of dissatisfied
and unspecialized chimpanzee-like individuals that in a moment in time
occupied the same niche.
Why do some organisms "choose" one kind of evolution over the other
kind? The answer seems to be related to two simple words: satisfaction and
dissatisfaction. Going back to our primate example, we can formulate an
interesting question: Who was satisfied and who was not? The answer seems
to be a simple one. The ones with better physical attributes (longer tail,
appropriate brain capacity and so on) to compete in the trees were relatively
more satisfied than the individuals who did not have those attributes,including24
a smaller or larger brain capacity. Furthermore, the less specialized
individuals were the ones who changed niches.
It is a matter of debate whether they voluntarily "took off" or whether
they were "kicked out" of the trees, or if it were a combination of both, but
that is beyond the scope of this essay. The important thing here is that the
less specialized individuals were the ones who moved on; the more specialized
stayed. This argument cannot be proved, but it is very logical, and it is
considered as a good possibility by important biologists. For example,
Helena Curtis, author of several essays on biological evolution and of a
biology text book used in major universities in the United States, offered the
following reasoning: "We do not know why one group of apes and not another
moved into the grasslands. One possible explanation was that this group was
driven out of the woodland, then contracting in size, by competition with other
primates. Perhaps they possessed some important characteristic that we do not
know about it." 2' What we know is that the group that was repelled from, or
voluntary evacuated, the woodland was, beyond any doubt, less fitted to
compete in it; it was driven out by a group that was more adapted to the old
niche.
One final but important thing remains to be mentioned: very few
attempts by non-satisfied individuals to enter or form a new niche are
successful. Most of them fail in such adventures and perish.It is highly
improbable that the first primates that attempted to leave the trees and move to25
the ground succeeded at once. Many of the experiments probably did not
flourish for a variety of reasons; and even if the only thing we can do about it
is to speculate, some reasonable arguments may be given. For example, a
rationale for failure could be that some of the individuals who made an
attempt were not smart enough to survive in the new niche, or perhaps they
lacked the physical attributes to hold a stick or throw a rock. Maybe some
groups did not step down at the right time and the weather hampered their
success. Or it could be that those adventurous primates did not encounter the
right setting on the ground because of too much competition or a rough
terrain. But the important thing is that the ones that did succeed encountered
at the time a series of advantageous conditions that, as physical vectors, added
up and contributed to their survival and further specific evolution in the new
niche.
To sum up, there are two distinct ways in which life may evolve. One
is the specific evolution that operates by selecting those individuals who are
born with the genetic traits that allow them to exploit their niche more
efficiently than others. In Table 1 this specific progress goes horizontally
from left to right. The other is general evolution, which selects those
individuals who are less fitted to exploit their specific niche to move into a
higher stage of life (or lower, in the case of degeneration). This can be
observed in Table 1 from the bottom up.26
SOCIAL EVOLUTION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF INFELICITY
Conflict is the basic
mechanism of change.
Ibn Khaldun22
It is our intention to show that the Theory of Evolutionary Potential
present in the biological realm is also at work in the evolution of societies. In
the social realm, as in biology, individuals, and the groups formed by them,
who are unhappy in their environment have a tendency to look for new
alternatives. Most attempts will fail, but for those few who are able to make
it, the results can be rewarding: the evolution of a new species or the
implementation of a new idea. To accomplish part of this goal we are going
to discuss first the development of capitalism in England and then the attempts
to establish socialism in Latin America in the twentieth century.27
The Rise of Capitalism in England
Since Herodotus' time, perhaps even before, scholars have noticed the
non-linear form that characterizes social evolution: "human prosperity never
abides long in the same place." Nevertheless, influenced by the Hegelian
dialectic of the nineteenth century on the one hand and by Hobbes' theories
regarding the inability of humans to change on the other, the non-linear nature
of social evolution has been put aside by many scholars. For example, in his
theory of capitalist development in England, Karl Marx argued that "the
economic structure of capitalist society has grown out of the economic
structure of feudal society. The dissolution of the latter set free the elements
of the former."23 In other words, feudalism, according to Marx, had to develop
and then "dissolve" in order for capitalism to start its own development.
Furthermore, Marx believed that England was the most advanced feudal
country in Europe before capitalism (as a result of the industrial revolution)
developed as a socio-economic alternative to feudalism. But that was not
actually the case. In fact, according to many historians, England probably was
from 1066 to the eighteenth century the country that benefitted least, or which
was made most unhappy, by the feudal system. This infelicity was shown by
the many rebellions and the lack of autonomy which characterized feudal
England. This argument seems to be outlined by Marx himself when he
acknowledged that the "Catholic church was [at the time of the Reformation]28
...[a] feudal proprietor of a great part of English land."' This dominion
started to be universal by the thirteenth century, when in May of 1213 John
"Lack land" agreed to hold England as a fief of the Papacy --from this
incident his peculiar nickname originated. After 147 years of Norman rule,
England still was unable to exert any control over its own lands.
Before the Reformation, England, as well as Germany, was controlled by a
powerful Catholic church with a relatively efficient feudal system. English
kings from William the Conqueror in 1066 to King Richard II in 1389 never
lived in their kingdom and spent most of their time either in Normandy or
France. Economic decisions concerning England were made by the kings of
those countries taking into consideration French and Norman interests over
England's.
This condition of vassalage felt very uncomfortable on the English
side, and the Italian republics, France, and Spain were more satisfied in
economic and sociological terms with the benefits of feudalism than England.
Therefore, a key question posed by many English historians: Did the French
succeed in imposing on England the ethics and beliefs necessary for the
development of an efficient feudal system? We will venture to answer, unlike
Marx, that the evidence indicates the contrary. Feudalism was never
prosperous on English soil, neither during the Norman period nor in the
prelude to the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century. This idea is
consistent with the main argument of this thesis: in general evolutionary terms,29
infelicity enhances the possibilities for a change in niche. Now, this point will
be demonstrated.
The period of the Norman Conquest was characterized by the forced
imposition of French ethics in culture and government on Britain. Even rival
political schools like those represented by Edward A. Freeman (admirers of
the Anglo-Saxon culture) and John Horace Round (admirers of Norman
political culture) agree on this point.In Edward Freeman's words, the
Norman period "affected our blood, our language, and our arts; X26 and for
Round, "it gave us, suddenly, a strong, purposeful monarchy."' There is no
doubt that the influence of the Normans deeply affected most aspects of
English life, but, more importantly, it did not permanently change
Anglo-Saxon culture; it was a "temporary overthrow of our national being."28
The reason appears to be that Anglo-Saxon culture, which was more pluralistic
than Latin culture, was not congruent with the ethics of feudalism.
Before the Norman invasion English society was characterized by
private ownership of land. For example, the Oxford History of Britain stated
that before the Norman conquest "land was reckoned in 'hides', each
nationally the area needed to support a free peasant cultivator and his
family...the most prominent figure in the early sources is the free peasant
farmer or cerol [italics in the original], typically cultivating one hide of
land."29 This system drastically differs from the pyramidal and centralized
feudal model, in which all land is property of the king and peasants have no30
control over the fief they work on. The change the Norman conquerors
imposed on England consequently brought a series of incidents that reflected
the unhappiness experienced by many sectors of its population. Right after
Duke William of Normandy defeated and killed King Harold of England at
Hastings in October of 1066, a series of upheavals, never experienced in much
calmer Anglo-Saxon society, occurred in England. Among them we find the
English rebellions of 1067-1070; the Harrying of the North, 1069-70; the civil
war of 1139-53; the Battle of Lincoln, 1141; the civil war of 1215; the civil
war of 1321-22; the Hundred Years War, 1337-1437; the English Political
Crisis, 1339-41; the Peasants' Revolt, 1381; and many more. All this
instability was a sign of the incompatibility of English culture with the
Norman and French feudal idiosyncrasy, which was a reflection of the values
preached by the Roman-based Catholic Church. These incongruities in beliefs
brought with them a crisis in authority that characterized the period. This
crisis brought with it the climax of the events of the English feudal system:
the conversion to Protestantism in the first part of the sixteenth century which
in the long run put an end to the French and Catholic influence in England.
Many scholars have investigated the impact that the Norman Conquest
had on England, and, as it is to be expected, there are different opinions on
the matter. Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-92), one of the most
distinguished English historians who wrote about the subject, was, as
mentioned above, sympathetic to the pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxons. He31
regarded the Conquest as a very important event in English history. However,
it was an event that did not transform the anti-feudal tendencies of the
Anglo-Saxons, or in his own words, "the older and stronger elements [as the
private ownership of land] still survived, and in the long run they again made
good their supremacy."3° Freeman argues that the Normans never understood
the idiosyncrasy of the Anglo-Saxon culture and that they tried to impose in a
raw way their feudal-monarchic values without taking into consideration the
nature of the displaced nation. To put it in his own words, he regarded the
Norman Conquest of England as an "insoluble puzzle without a clear notion of
the condition of England and the English people at the time when the
Conqueror [William] and his followers first set foot upon our shores."31 A
kingdom purely Teutonic was brought within the sphere of the laws, the
manners, and the speech of the Latin nations. The impact of the Conquest was
definitely felt by the peasantry, which was gradually deprived of the land and
liberties it had enjoyed under the kingdom of Harold Godwinson. Under these
conditions it was not to be expected that England would exhibit social, as well
as economic, stability. The many rebellions during the feudal period were, in
fact, clear signs of the infelicity and political instability characteristic of
countries with lack of trust and respect for their rulers, principles on which
genuine authority is based.
Then, if our thesis is correct, England was in a position to experiment
with alternative models of production. The first apparent important innovation32
was the one called bastard feudalism, a term that was brought up first by
Charles Plumer and later by K. B. McFarlane, who introduced the adjective
bastard as something "having the appearance of, somewhat resembling
[feudalism]."32 During the two centuries that followed the death of Edward I in
1307, "the new order of patronage, liveries and affinities occupied the front of
the stage... with an epilogue which far outran medieval times.It is this new
order that we call 'bastard feudalism.'Its quintessence was payment for
service."33
Thus, we can see this infelicity-driven innovation approaching
capitalism. Of course, part of the new order was the emigration of landless
peasants to the city, where the lucky ones found jobs in factories and where
payment as exchange for service was also the rule. This period of "bastard
feudalism," roughly from the early fourteenth century up to the late
seventeenth century, was the result of England's attempt to rid itself of
feudalism. As we all know, England made out of this new experiment a
success story. How?
In Chapter One we mentioned that whether, in a particular time, an
individual "chooses" to keep on exploiting his own niche (in which he can be
dominant or be dominated) or tries to look for (or make) a new one, depends
on three things: 1) the degree of competition in his own niche; 2) the
biological attributes of that individual; and 3) the availability of an alternate
niche with a lower level of competition. These three conditions also appear to33
be present in the social realm for general evolution because the
change-promoting motor called dissatisfaction is also at work here. Whether,
in a particular time, a group of substantial and influential individuals in a
society (which is nothing more than individuals tied by common goals)
"chooses" to keep on implementing a certain socio-economic model or go for
an alternative will depend on congruent factors: first, the degree of relative
competition it confronts in the present socio-economic model; second, the
economic and cultural capacity of a country --which is the sociological
counterpart for the physical capability mentioned for the biological realm-- to
assimilate a new socio-economic structure; and third, the availability of an
alternate socio-economic model with relatively less competition.
To explain this argument in detail let us take a look once again at the
English environment during the time of the Protestant Reformation, where, for
the reasons given above and others that will follow, England's ability to
replicate the relative success the feudal model had in other European countries
was aborted. The relative competition England confronted within the feudal
world was very high. Not only was all of Europe feudal, but Roman countries
were more powerful at the time. Latin nations were in control of most of the
New World in the sixteenth century, and their armies and navies were very
powerful. English lands were the property of the Catholic church, which
obstructed local initiative to make feudalism more productive because major
economic decisions were not made by local government.3434
England was, as Germany, outmatched by feudal Latin countries. If
England were going to be better off, the alternative was not to defeat the
Roman nations within their feudal socio-economic structure, but to find a new
way of production in which it was capable of surviving. This new way of
production, as we well know, consisted of the implementation of machines to
produce manufactured goods.
In the new industrial capitalist way of production, contrary to the
feudal one, competition was non-existent because there were no other
industrial capitalist states. The use of machines allowed the English to
develop a new economic niche that was thermodynamically more efficient
simply because the use of machines increases labor productivity. But the
English were very lucky with their experiment because the new ethos
associated with the new Protestant religion was congruent with the capitalist
system. This provided them with the necessary cultural receptivity that, as
Trotsky pointed out, is necessary to assimilate a new socio-economic order.
The Protestant ethic in many ways contributed to the development of
capitalism, first in England and then in the rest of the Protestant world. Max
Weber's famous thesis found in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, which deals with Protestant influence on the development of
capitalism, illustrates this point.
Weber's argument consists of an association between Protestant ethics
and the production of capital, with its necessary continuous reinvestment. He35
argues that before the Reformation capitalist enterprise was only used as a
means to pursue material comfort or power; it was not really concerned with
the accumulation of money. The Reformation, he states, changed that, and
people began to be more interested in the accumulation and reinvestment of
wealth by itself rather than in the material rewards associated with it.In a
capitalist society man is, in short, "dominated by the making of money."35
The reason for the change, Weber argues, is the spirit of Protestantism
and its notion of calling. According to him, the notion of calling was
introduced by the Protestant Reformation. It consists of the idea of the moral
obligation a person has to perform in this world. Contrary to the Catholic
faith, this moral obligation is to be respected at all times. This idea of calling,
obvious in the first of Luther's ninety-five theses in which he equated
repentance to an entire life of penitence, became more developed in some
Puritan sects, especially among Calvinists. Weber states that the concept of
predestination introduced by Calvin was crucial to the development of the
notion of calling.
The idea that only some humans were chosen for salvation created
anxiety for the believers who wondered: Am I among the chosen ones? In
Weber's opinion, accumulation of wealth was, and still is, associated with a
sign of worth. This constituted the basis for capitalist development.
It must be emphasized that the notion of a Calvinist consensus does not
necessarily imply that all the English who regarded themselves as Protestants36
during the seventeenth century were explicitly Calvinists. We are concerned
here with the opinions of an educated elite. The basic point concerns
Calvinist hegemony. But hegemony is not monopoly. Nevertheless,
Calvinism was predominant among influential circles of the English society,
or, as P.G. Lake argues, "the existence of such people [anti-Calvinists] and
their silence represent powerful evidence of the extent to which Calvinism had
established itself in control of the crucial cultural media of the day and was
thus able to suppress overt criticism."37 Puritanism gave England the cultural
receptivity necessary to develop capitalism. But what about economic
capability? Once again, Weber's argument seems reasonable. He mentions
two socio-economic conditions present in England that facilitated the
development of capitalism. First was the separation of the household from the
enterprise, which provided a different frame to conduct business; second was
the development of the modern city with a large working class.
So England's possibility of entering a new niche where competition
was practically non-existent was only waiting for the necessary "physical"
attribute for the new model to be successful: James Watt's invention in 1769
of the first steam machine, which "had begun the industrial revolution."38
After this transcendental invention, the doors of capitalism opened to England.
In conclusion, the development of capitalism in England is rooted in
the lack of socio-economic comfort it found during the period of the Norman
Conquest. Then, feudalism was imposed on a nation with a culture not suited37
for it.Today, as a historical parallel, in Latin America a similar historical
situation is present; and the region is confronting the forceful imposition by
the United States and other capitalist nations of a system that does not match
the reality of Latin Americans.38
The Rise of Socialism in Latin America
It is not our argument that the United States and other developed
capitalist nations are responsible for the ill state in which Latin American
capitalist economies find themselves. In fact, it is our belief that the reason for
the failure comes from within and not from without. The point is that Latin
Americans are incompetent capitalists because their culture, contrary to the
Protestant one, is not as consistent with the ethos associated to that mode of
production---namely economic competition and physical exploitation between
men to achieve accumulation of wealth. In other words, the cultural capacity
necessary to be successful in the capitalist world is not present in the Latin
traditions.
The degree of cultural capacity of a nation is related to its readiness to
assimilate a certain economic model. By cultural capacity we mean that the
cultural traditions of a country have to be congruent with the socio-economic
requirements presented by a certain socio-economic niche. If this is not the
case the result will be psychological infelicity, which in turn will produce
economic and social chaos.
When the economical problems of a country are the result of natural
disasters, wars, or any other factor that is not related to psychological
infelicity, there can always be a light at the end of the tunnel. But when the
problem arises from incompatibility between culture and economy, the39
symptoms are the same we saw present in medieval England, which are not
very different from those present in most of today's Latin American nations.
Exponential inflation, astronomical external debt, and backward educational
and medical conditions are to be expected.
But the psychological impact on society is even more astonishing and
is exhibited in: homicides, civil and governmental corruption, prostitution, civil
wars, military coups, and many other common social disasters. Even more
frightening are the death squads that have appeared during the last decade in
several Latin American metropolises, mainly in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This
new edition of death squads do not kill for political reasons; they are hired by
local merchants to kill the homeless, the small drug dealer, and street kids
because they "slow down the business."39 This disgrace could be explained in
terms of breakdown of the community, or, as Arnold Toynbee inferred, "there
is often a breakdown which occurs when the creative elite no longer function
adequately, the majority no longer gives its allegiance to and imitates the elite
and social unity disintegrates."'If one were to pay a visit to any Latin
American country, one would see many of these symptoms of disintegration
with one's own eyes; one would also be shocked by how much medicine for
los nervios (the nerves) Latin Americans consume.
As a first step for Latin America to escape its social and economic
calamities, one of these two prescriptions could be beneficial: to change its
culture or to change its economy. The first possibility is very difficult, if not40
impossible, as will be explained in detail later in this chapter. The second is
also very challenging but not impossible. The formula could be to change the
economy of the country from a capitalist one associated with individuality and
competition (characteristics of Protestant culture) to a socialist one associated
with central planning and popular participation to achieve the common good
--characteristics of Latin American culture.
In the last chapter we tried to explain how Protestant ethos, among
other historical accidents, was favorable to the development of capitalism in
England. Now we propose to explain how the Catholic ethos is compatible
with socialist principles oriented toward the common good of the people.
Today Latin American countries are in a situation similar to that of
England at the time of the Reformation: citizens are unhappy with their
present political situation and they cannot favorably compete within the
capitalist world the same way England could not compete in medieval times
inside the feudal world. Some Latin American nations might have today what
England had when capitalism started its development: economic capacity and
cultural receptivity to develop in a more efficient socio-economic order. In
fact, some Latin American nations today have the economic and the cultural
capacities to move up in the ladder concerning general evolution (see Table 8).
First of all, the economic potential of the region, in terms of natural resources,
is enormous. Second, cultural tendencies in Latin America are oriented toward
the common good of the state.That is, Latin Americans are culturally41
inclined to accept a society with socialist tendencies, which, within the right
setting, is a step forward in the evolution of human relations. This will be
explained in detail later in the chapter.
If, however, as was mentioned above, in those countries an
infrastructure based on a capitalist economy is enforced, the present situation
is to be expected --that is, inflation, external debt, unemployment, infant
mortality, illiteracy, and many other calamities which are part of the present
life of many Latin Americans. One thing is clear: capitalism has failed in
Latin America. In more than one hundred fifty years, capitalism, externally
imposed, has promoted social inequality and political instability.
It could be argued that capitalism has been present in the region since
the Spanish and Portuguese conquest, but the system brought to Latin America
by those nations was not capitalism.It resembled more what Immanuel
Wallerstein and others called mercantilism,41 in which the industrial production
associated with investment and reinvestment is not present as it is in
capitalism,
But the attempts to introduce capitalism in Latin America have also
increased dissatisfaction, which is the motor that has been encouraging Latin
America during the twentieth century to venture into a new social order. The
failure or the victory of the new social order will depend on many factors.
Some of them have been discussed; some others, such as the Catholic ethos
and the spirit of socialism, will be discussed next.42
Latin American political culture has its origins mostly in Catholic
Spain and Portugal. This factor explains why many cultural beliefs were
established resembling those of the Catholic religion. Perhaps the most
influential scholar-priest in Spanish political thought was Saint Thomas
Aquinas; his version of a just government was a political system aimed at the
common good of the society. This was clearly stated in his On Kingship:
"If...a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler toward the common good
[Italics added] of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is
suitable to free men.42" For Latin Americans, to rule for the common good is
to rule in a way in which personal interest is second to social justice. This
concept is at odds with the spirit of capitalism where freedom is rather
associated with free enterprise.
Saint Thomas Aquinas' common good policies became accepted in
Catholic countries (which faced the threat created by Luther and his
successors) during the Counter Reformation. Luther's revival of Saint Paul's
and Saint Augustine's visions, besides exerting influence on the minds of
those who joined the Reformation, also altered the way of thinking, and the
faith, of many Catholics. This was clearly formulated by A. G. Dickens in his
book The Counter Reformation. He noticed that in Catholic countries during
the first half of the sixteenth century "many small men...transcended the old
disputes over papal authority and began to question the whole status, ministry
and organization of the Church."'"43
In the midst of the Renaissance and its authority crisis, Luther and the
Protestants found an authority figure in Saint Augustine that gave a certain
legitimacy to Protestantism, but the Catholic Church was lacking one. In
order to conduct a search for authority the Church celebrated a high level
meeting that started in December 1545 and ended two decades later, known as
the Council of Trent or Concilio de Trento. This set of meetings was the most
important Counter Reformation attempt of the sixteen century, and its
resolutions are still valid for today's Catholics. Among the rules adopted by
the Council was a deliberate defiance of Lutheran teachings by agreeing that
"scripture and tradition should have equal validity as sources of truth."44
Protestants base their faith only in the Bible's interpretation and not on
traditional standpoints like secular philosophical works. By this measure
Catholics placed ecclesiastical tradition on the same level as the Bible. But,
more important, "it was a victory for the rising tides of Thomism (i.e., for the
notion of common good as a Catholic tradition) and a defeat for those
Augustinian...emphases [on scripture] which had helped to stimulate the
Protestant Reformation."45 This was the process by which Saint Thomas
Aquinas' teachings were incorporated into Catholic's beliefs.
Cultures are not formed at random, and values tend to pass from one
generation to another unless there is a radical movement, such as the
Protestant Reformation, which changes the interpretation of the means
(scripture and behavior) to achieve the end (salvation, eternity or immortality).44
Latin American societies of today, as in Saint Thomas' times, are
inclined to believe that just governments should place the interest of the many
above individual freedom. In Latin American minds, the concept of the
legitimacy of a government is associated with the concept of the common
good. This has been pointed out by several Latin American scholars, notably
Glen C. Dealy", in an article in the 1983 Spring edition of Foreign Policy in
which he made the following argument: "Latin American regimes eventually
face a legitimacy test that divides them into one of two types: those which
endeavor to rule in the name of the whole...and those which aim to govern in
the name of a privileged part...The masses consider the first type of
government legitimate but not the second."47 Again, Latin Americans tend to
agree with. Saint Thomas Aquinas that the common good unites the community
and a government that keeps those unitarian principles as legitimate.
The socialist tendencies many times expressed by Latin American
revolutionary movements can very well be explained in terms of Aquinas'
devotion to the common good." Both notions are concerned with the well-
being of the community above all things. This includes, of course, a refusal of
the working people to accept capitalistic, privately-owned enterprises as
legitimate institutions. History had told us that Latin Americans perceive
enterprises that are publicly owned as a more legitimate alternative to private
business. For example, when in 1938 Mexican President Lazar° Cardenas
nationalized his country's oil reserves, the news was reason for national45
celebration. Furthermore, in order to be able to pay the compensation the
companies requested, the public turned out massively at the treasury's office
offering whatever valuable belongings they had, as part of their contribution to
the nationalization of oil.
The example of Mexico is also applicable for the cases of oil
nationalization in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela and other Latin American
countries, which at different times took similar economic measures and were
backed up by the working masses.
A more recent example concerns Puerto Rico, a country that has been a
colony of the United States since being invaded in 1898. In 1990 the
government tried to sell the phone company to private enterprise, and the
result was a series of general strikes which paralyzed the country's economy
on more than one occasion. These strikes not only included the workers of
the telephone company but all public employees. As a result of the negative
impact of this attempt, the government was obligated to cancel the projected
sale of the Puerto Rico Telephone Company, better known on the island as
Nuestra Telefonica [Our Telephone Company]. In spite of an equal monetary
offer by part of the private sector, the workers wanted the company to remain
public.It is obvious that even after almost one hundred years of United States
direct control over Puerto Rico, the colonizer has not being able to impose its
most fundamental values on such a small colonized country.46
At this point (encouraged by the Puerto Rican example), one may ask
how valid is our assumption that the Latin American cultural ethos has
remained almost unchanged since Saint Thomas' time. To answer this
question, it is important to notice two aspects concerning social evolution:
culture and technology. Technological change occurs much faster than does
cultural evolution.It is easier for a society to accept technological changes
than to alter traditional patterns of cultural behavior. An excellent analysis
regarding this was made by socio-biologist David P. Barash. In his book The
Hare and the Tortoise, Barash argues that "we might further subdivide cultural
evolution into two major components: social evolution and technological
evolution...social evolution occurs in a time frame of decades, more often
hundreds or even thousands of years...very slow compared with the other great
pillar of cultural evolution, technological change.""
For example, social evolution includes religion, which changes very
slowly. In contrast, the technology used for the spread of faith, in particular
Christianity, has been changing very fast, from direct oral communication and
papyrus scrolls in ancient times to today's satellite-televised preachers. To
back up his argument Barash cites as an example the differences between
today's United States society and that of 150 years ago. He notes that in the
interval of 150 years, social change has been very slow. Technologically
speaking, however, changes have occurred rapidly.47
The contemporary Japanese society offers another example. It has
accepted and developed many new technologies, but it is still firmly attached
to most of the traditions associated with its culture and religion.
Another good example of this idea is Saudi Arabia, which, much like
Japan, has accepted many kinds of Western technologies but has not
significantly altered its traditional pattern of behavior. How many times did
we see on television Saudi Arabians, in the midst of the 1990-1991 Gulf
Crisis, operating a computer or piloting a jet while wearing their traditional
clothing?
In sum, Latin American culture has not significantly changed its notion
of common good, prevalent in that society since the Catholic conquest
centuries ago; there is nothing apparent that might change or disturb that
particular form of behavior. Its common good orientation is at odds with
capitalist ethics and is more consistent with the socialist-centralized mode of
production, where wealth is distributed more evenly among its citizens if
compared to capitalism. The problem is: will the United States government
allow a socialist government to succeed in its "backyard"?.48
NEGATIVE VECTORS
It has been established
that the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must.
Thucydides"
As was mentioned in the last chapter, the United States is not
responsible for the failure of capitalism in Latin America; Latin culture is to
blame for such a debacle. But we firmly believe that the government of the
United States, and to a certain extent the other Western powers, is responsible
for many of the misfortunes suffered by countries that try to experiment with
economic models of socialistic tendencies. This chapter is an attempt to
demonstrate that many of the reasons for the failure in several tries to
establish a successful socialist government in the region come not from within
but from without.
If one is aware of the course inter-American relations (relations
between Latin American countries and the United States) have taken in the
twentieth century, a pattern of behavior can easily be discerned: the United
States has done everything possible, legal or otherwise, to destabilize
pro-socialist governments in the region. Furthermore, this pattern of behavior
goes beyond the continent and has been consistent, particularly in
underdeveloped socialist nations, e.g., Korea, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos,
Ethiopia, Angola, and so on. Only when underdeveloped socialist nations49
give up their policies and say "Uncle" (as was the case in Nicaragua) does
this hostility seem to come to an end. The United States' antagonism toward
socialism in Latin America ranges from Cuba's all-state controlled economy to
Nicaragua's mixed one. From supporting the army trying to stop the advances
of the Farabundo Marti Para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) in the armed
struggle in El Salvador, to the backing of Chilean General Augusto Pinochet's
coup d'etat in Chile, the United States government's strategy has always
consisted of trying to stop the "advance of communism" in the region, or, in
social evolutionary words, to prevent a successful attempt by any of these
countries to develop a new way of production other than capitalism. This
could threaten United States interests and potential investment in that country.
Unfortunately for many Latin American nations, the United States often
has been able to frustrate these ventures. The last successful intervention
(which does not have to be a directly armed one) was in Nicaragua, which
culminated with the defeat of the Frente Sandinista para la Liberacion
Nacional (FSLN) candidate, Daniel Ortega, in the 1990 general elections. In
that occasion, the United States-backed candidate, Violeta Barrios de
Chamorro, was the winner. One can not go so as far as to say that the
Sandinistas themselves are not to be blamed at all for their defeat, but most of
the blame inevitably falls on continuous United States intervention for a
decade. We are mainly referring to the economic embargo on Nicaragua
(which at one point included the illegal mining of the two important ocean50
ports of Corinto and Bluefields) and to the creation and continuous support,
legally (in United States Congress terms of legality) and illegally
(Iran-Contra), of the Contra rebels.
The United States government justified the treatment it gave to
revolutionary Nicaragua by saying that the Sandinista government was not,
according to United States standards, democratic. This was a weak argument
because there were indeed democratic elections in Nicaragua in 1984 when
Daniel Ortega easily won with more than sixty percent of the vote. In that
year the United States was about the only country in the world that did not
categorize the results of the elections as honest. With this kind of background
there is little reason to doubt that if Ortega had won the 1990 ballot, the
United States government would have invented another excuse (arms
shipments to the FMLN rebels in El Salvador by the Sandinistas, for one) to
continue its policy of belligerence toward Nicaragua. The United States
government (the players might change, but the game is about the same) does
not appear to care much about what kind of government Nicaragua has (it
supported the Somoza Dynasty for decades) or how a particular government
comes to power. The real concern of the United States is to prevent by all
means possible the establishment of a successful socialist government in the
hemisphere, and eventually in the whole world.
Cuba is another country that has been punished by the United States
for more than three decades. The retribution did not begin immediately after51
the triumph of the revolution in January 1959, but rather soon after that
country gave signals of its intentions to establish a socialist government on the
island. The United States Air Force strikes on the airports of Santiago de Cuba
and Havana in 1961, followed by the invasion of Bahia de Cochinos (Bay of
Pigs), marked the beginning of hostilities against Fidel Castro's new socialist
government. After the invasion failed, United States aggression toward Cuba
became quite open, ranging from the imposition of an economic embargo
following the 1962 Missile Crisis to the broadcasting of Television Marti'
beginning in 1988. Other countries of Latin America that have tried to
establish socialist systems have been more directly affected than Nicaragua or
Cuba by the United States' opposition to a new order. The best example is the
Caribbean island of Grenada, which was invaded by United States armed
forces in October 1983, four years after a socialist revolution overthrew the
government of the pompous dictator Eric Gairy. His regime, as illegitimate
and repressive and anti-democratic as it was, never felt threatened by the
United States.
The Dominican Republic suffered the same fate when United States
armed forces intervened in 1965. On that occasion the democratically elected
socialist government of Juan Bosch was the target of the United States'
leadership. His government ended abruptly with the landing of United States
marines on that island.52
What is the rationale behind this systematic hostility? Given the fact
that some elected governments have been chosen as targets, while right-wing
dictatorships (e.g., Chile, Paraguay, Grenada, Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti) have not
been disturbed beyond the point of artificial economic sanctions, the rationale
for intervention is not the establishment of democracies. This argument is the
excuse given by the United States government to its own people in its attempt
to justify the reasons for intervention; it is an apology for internal
consumption.
Then, why does the National Security Council (NSC) at times decide to
make things tough for a specific country? We do not know whether the NSC
has made a similar analysis to ours: those countries are trying to enter a
superior socio-economic niche. If they do so, sooner or later, borrowing
technologies from industrialized nations, they will be in a better economic
position than the capitalist world. Some arguments (mainly made by dogmatic
Marxists) persist that the aggression is mostly economic, because of the
impending profit loss United States corporations might face in socialist
countries. It is also argued by some right-wing theoreticians that the nature of
the aggression is based on political chauvinism: be like us, have a United
States-style democracy, and you will succeed. It could even be argued that a
combination of all, or some, of the above is the rationale. But what is
important is that for those taking an upward step in the general evolutionary
scale, this aggression is making their venture very rough and its success53
unlikely, and that is precisely what the United States government wants. The
wrath of the empire is focused on socialism, and its government will not
tolerate a socialist government in its "backyard."Several United States
administrations have been concerned with the ends of its imperialist policies
and not with the nature of its means. There is always a good rationalization
for imperialist behavior. Or, in the words of William Appleman Williams:52
"Empire became so intrinsically our American way of life that we rationalized
and suppressed the nature of our means in the euphoria of our enjoyment of
the ends.""
The nature of the aggression may change according to the specific
conditions of the nation in question. Direct military intervention has been
limited, due in part to the Viet Nam debacle, to countries the size of Grenada,
where a quick strike will guarantee the overthrow of a socialist nation. This,
and not the Khrushchev- Kennedy treaty,54 is the reason why Cuba has not yet
been invaded by the United States for a second time.
With relatively strong countries the actual strategy for the destruction
of the socialist government seems to be one of economic deterioration, with
the hope that internal conditions will reach a point at which people inside the
country in question will not tolerate it any longer. This was exactly what
happened in Nicaragua, where the majority of the people who voted were so
unhappy with the new order (for the reasons given above) that many of them
forgot about their own unhappiness ten years ago and voted against socialism.54
In Cuba, the NSC is trying by all means possible to make things so
desperate on the island that the revolutionaries are forced to make some kind
of realignment in their position with respect to socialism. But with the relative
success the United States' technology had in defeating the Iraqi army in the
1991 Gulf War, perhaps a more bellicose reaction from the United States can
be expected. At least, this is our interpretation of George Bush's statements
concerning the death of the Viet Nam ghost. Furthermore, the new bellicose
approach of the NSC was stated very clearly when the United States army
chief of staff, Collin Powell, uttered: "El Salvador's conflict, if necessary, can
be resolved the way it was [in the same manner as] the Persian Gulf."55
One thing is certain: the aggression to which Latin American countries
have been subjected, whatever its rationale, diminishes the possibility of
success in the new socio-economic niche; it is a strong negative vector. The
empire's strategy seems to be working; it has worked so well that if the
FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador some day come to power, either as a military
force or as a political party, almost certainly they will have to struggle against
the capitalist empire's wrath. This is perhaps best expressed by what Arnold
Toynbee called "pressures." In Toynbee's terminology, he defined several
stimuli which confront and challenge civilizations and pointed out that
"pressures," meaning a continual external threat, were of "major importance to
the rise or failure of a society."56 The negative vector is exerting a hard
pressure, and it is succeeding, by now, in canceling the positive ones.55
Nevertheless, the struggle of the Latin American socialists of the
twentieth century, as well as the heroism of the guerrilleros of Central and
South America in the last part of this century, are indications that the spirit of
socialism is not dead in Latin America.
The fight against great odds represents nature at its best and has its
analogies in history, or, as Toynbee asserted, "the growth of the civilization
hinges on the behavior of a creative minority. X57It has a resemblance with the
many attempts made by several nations to abandon their old niche and enter a
new one. It also has a similarity to those ancient unfitted apes which were
driven out of the woodland. The parallel is that most attempts failed, but when
for reasons beyond our imagination (without a doubt a combination of causes
and chances) all vectors aligned and the attempt was successful, it was a step
forward in climbing the steep hill in the evolution of this amazing animal
kingdom.
Similarly, if all vectors mentioned above concerning social evolution
align, socialism in Latin America will flourish not only because its spirit has
an affinity with their culture, but also because socialism is the best
evolutionary alternative.56
CONCLUSION
No hay otra regi6n en el mundo
co mejores posibilidades y alternativas
que America Latina. Somos un pueblo con
un idioma y cultura de coman origen; con
dos oceanos y un Mar Caribe rodeado de
enormes extenciones de terreno y recursos
naturales con los que podemos crecer y
progresar hasta el limite de nuestras voluntades.
Willie Co 161158
Latin American countries have a good chance to develop socialism.
This opportunity, however, has been curtailed by the actions of the United
States government and other capitalist nations. As a result many attempts to
establish socialism in the region have failed.
Nevertheless, some people in countries such as El Salvador, Colombia,
Guatemala, and Peru still attempt to institute that socio-economic system. The
desire for change in these nations can be explained as a consequence of
infelicity which arises from the incongruity between Latin American culture,
which resembles socialist ethics, and the government those countries have,
which resembles capitalist ethics.
In all probability, the first group of apes that descended from the
woodlands to the grasslands failed in adapting to the new niche. Nevertheless,
the struggle continued and despite the thousands of failures that preceded the
first successful group, despite overwhelming odds, resulted in the birth of
humanity.57
The failure or success of Latin Americans to establish socialism once
and for all will depend on a series of vectors. Most of them will prove to be
positive, e.g., culture, natural resources, too much competition within the
capitalist system, and lack of competition within the socialist system. But there
is a very important vector that counter-balances the positive ones: United
States imperialism. The future will depend in part on which side is stronger;
but chance also plays an important role.
The best situation for Latin Americans would be if the United States
government voluntarily stopped its intervention. But this possibility seems
unlikely in the short term because changes in Washington appear to be
cosmetic: Democrats and Republicans alike seem to be only interested in the
establishment of capitalist democracies and do not rule out intervention to
achieve such a goal.
The evidence presented indicates that the struggle for socialism in Latin
America will continue for a long time.58
TABLE 1
General and Specific Evolution
Time and levels of general
progress (general evolution)
increase
Mammals
Birds
Reptiles
Amphibians
Fish
Invertebrates
C B A Protozoa
Time and Specialization (specific evolution) increase59
TABLE 2
Fitness Compared to Specific Evolution
Fitness
increases
Time and Specific Evolution increase60
TABLE 3
Fitness Compared to General Evolution
Fitness
increases
Time and General Evolution increase61
TABLE 4
Level of Competition in Niche One
Compared to General Evolution
Competition in
Niche One (old Niche)
increases
General Evolution increases62
TABLE 5
Level of Competition in Niche Two
Compared to General Evolution
Competition
in Niche Two
(new niche)
increases
General Evolution increases63
TABLE 6
Availability of Alternate Niches
Compared to General Evolution
Number of
New Niches
Available
increases
General Evolution increases64
TABLE 7
A Primate Classification from Serological Reaction
Time increases
gibbon orag-utan GORILLACHIMPANZEE MEN
HylobatesPongo GORILLA PANHOMO Genus
Hylobatidae Pongidae HOMINIDAE(A)Family
Brain Capacity increases65
TABLE 8
Modes of Production
Time and Level of
General Progress
increases
Socialism, which by specific
evolution evolves into communism.
Capitalist State
Feudal State
Primitive Society
Time and Specialization (specific evolution) increase66
NOTES
1.Herodotus, The Histories (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1987),
43.When Herodotus argued that "prosperity never abides long in the same
place," or, as Paul Kennedy asserts in The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, that
"the history of rise and fall of great powers has in no way come to a full stop,"
69. the concept of social evolution is not present. Rather, they are referring to
change in command within the same socio-economic structure and not from an
inferior economic structure to a superior one, which is our area of concern.
Nevertheless, they introduced an important concept different from the Hegelian
dialectic of lineal progress, which is the basis for Marxist - communism.
2. The slope of a line is the ratio of the vertical change of distance compared
to the horizontal change of distance as we move from one point on a line to
another. A line with a positive slope increases from left to right. Hegel's
dialectics expected that the history of men would progress through time
without interruption. For an example of a positive slope, see Table 2.
3. The terms felicity, happiness, comfort, and fitness will be treated in the
text, for reasons of style, as synonyms.
4. Frederic J. E. Woodbridge, The Philosophy of Hobbes (Minneapolis: The
H. W. Wilson Company, 1903), 164.
5.Ibid., 208.
6. Mary P. Mack, Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas 1748-1792 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 110.
7.Ibid., 174.
8. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (New York: Jonathan Cape
& Harrison Smith, 1930), 143.
9.Ibid.
10.Ibid., 27.
11.Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle (London: Oxford University Press,
1958), 271.
12.Ibid.67
13. The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that in all energy exchanges
and conversions, if no energy leaves or enters the system under study, the
potential energy of the final state will always be less than the potential energy
of the initial state. For our example, a thermodynamically efficient individual
is nothing more than a relatively good converter of energy. A
thermodynamically efficient system will maximize production of goods with a
minimum of natural resources.
14. Gabriel Garcia Marquez, El olor de la guayaba (Mexico, D.F: Editorial la
Oveja Negra, 1982), 105.
15.It could be argued that poor sectors of the community of any country
behave in a way that resembles common good. We think those are only tides
of dependence, which become stronger as the social classes go lower. The
real meaning of common good is a centralized system where the state makes
its policies taking into consideration all sectors of the population.
16. Thomas G. Harding was a professor of evolution at the University of
Minnesota; he wrote several books and essays about social evolution.
17. Charles Darwin, The Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection
(New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1980), 359.
18. Thomas G. Harding, et al; Evolution and Culture (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1960), 14.
19.Ibid., 22.
20. A serological reaction is a chemical procedure performed in order to
detect the amount of serotonin present in the brain. The present of serotonin in
the brain increases proportionally to its capacity. This information is relevant
for the understanding of Table 7.
21. Helena Curtis, Biology (New York: Worth Publishers Inc., 1984), 1052.
22. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1967), 30.
23. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. II (New York:
International Publishers, 1984), 668.
24.Ibid., 675.68
25. Kenneth 0. Morgan ed., The Oxford History of Britain (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 150.
26. Warren C. Hollister ed., The Impact of the Norman Conquest (Malabar,
Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1982), 69.
27.Ibid., 24.
28. Ibid., 20.
29. Morgan, The Oxford History, 75-76.
30. Hollister, The Impact, 20.
31.Ibid., 21.
32.G.L. Harris, ed., England in the Fifteenth Century: Selected essays of
KB. McFarlane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 127.
33. Ibid.
34. Since the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 until late in the
fourteenth century, all English kings lived most of their lives in France as
vassals of France's king. Therefore, their economic and political decisions
were highly influenced by the king of France who was the suzerain. At the
time, the Catholic Church controlled the French monarchs.
35. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Boston:
Peter Smith, 1988), 153.
36. P. J. Lake is an English history professor at Oxford University.
37. P. J. Lake, "Calvinism and the English Church 1570-1635," Past &
Present (February 1987), 34.
38. Capital, 352.
39. CBS Television Network, 60 minutes, "Corruption in Brazil," May 19,
1991.
40. Robert. H. Laurer, Perspective on Social Change (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon Inc., 1982), 39.69
41. Wallerstein differentiated between mercantilism and capitalism mainly in
the part concerning the accumulation and reinvestment of capital. For example,
he mentioned that The Netherlands had the first successful mercantilist system
because of the efficiency of its fishing float, but that by itself is not considered
to be a capitalist enterprise.
42. Thomas Aquinas, On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus (Amsterdam:
Academische Press N.V., 1967), 7.
43. A. G. Dickens, The Counter Reformation (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company Inc., 1979), 19.
44. Ibid., 114.
45.Ibid., 132.
46. Glen C. Dealy is a Latin American scholar and author of several books on
the subject. He is a political science professor at Oregon State University.
47. Glen C. Dealy, "The Pluralistic Latins," Foreign Policy (Winter
1984-85), 123.
48. Carlos Fuentes, Conference at Oregon State University (Spring, 1990).
49. David P. Barash, The Hare and the Tortoise: Culture, Biology, and
Human Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 41.
50. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (New York: Modern
Library, 1951), 90
51. Television Marti, which broadcasts from Key West, Florida, started in
1988 as part of Reagan's plan to destabilize the socialist government of Cuba.
52. William Appleman Williams was professor of history at the University of
Wisconsin and Oregon State University and was James P. Harrison
distinguished professor at the College of William and Mary. He is the author
of a number of works in revisionist history.
53. William Appleman Williams, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the
Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament Along with a Few
Thoughts About an Alternative (New York, Oxford University Press, 1982), xi.70
54. The Khrushchev-Kennedy treaty was signed after the Cuban missile crisis
of October 1963. It consisted of an agreement between the Soviet and the
United States governments, in which the United States promised not to invade
Cuba if the Soviet missiles were withdrawn.
55. News Synthesis on El Salvador (Salpress, April 9, 1991).
56. Laurer, Perspective, 41.
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58. Willie Colon, Honrra y Cultura (New York: Sony Records, 1991). Willie
Colon is a popular Puerto Rican composer and singer.71
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